State of Utah v. Leon Earl Denney : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. Leon Earl Denney : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James L. Shumate; attorney for respondent.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; Charlene Barlow; Assistant Attorney General; attorneys for
petitioner.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Denney, No. 890305.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2652
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
.S9 
BRIEB 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
4 DOC^TNPl 
TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
LEON EARL DENNEY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No . PlD2>6-
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
THIS IS A BRIEF OPPOSING THE PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT FROM 
AN OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FILED 
JUNE 14, 1989, REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ORDER. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
IS DATED JULY 14, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
JAMES L. SHUMATE 
110 North Main, Suite H 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorney for Respondent 
FILED 
AUG 18 1989 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
LEON EARL DENNEY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
THIS IS A BRIEF OPPOSING THE PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT FROM 
AN OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FILED 
JUNE 14, 1989, REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ORDER. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
IS DATED JULY 14, 1989. 
JAMES L. SHUMATE 
110 North Main, Suite H 
P.O. BOX 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorney for Respondent 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
OPINION BELOW 1 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES AND RULES. . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE COURT OF APPEALS APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE 
STANDARD SET FORTH IN STATE V. GREEN. 
757 P2.D 462 (UTAH 1989) 4 
CONCLUSION 6 
ADDENDUM 8 
Page 
4, 5, 6 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah, 1988) 
STATUTES 
77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 2, 3 
78-2-2(3)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 2 
RULES 
Rule 42, Rules of Utah Supreme Court 2 
Rule 43, Rules of Utah Supreme Court 2, 5, 6 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
House Bill 314, Laws of Utah, 1989, Chapter 226 5 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v, ] 
LEON EARL DENNEY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
i Case No. 
I Category No 
BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should the Utah Supreme Court exercise its jurisdiction 
in granting a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's 
denial of the Defendant's Motion to terminate probation nunc pro 
tunc following a statutory eighteen-month period? 
OPINION BELOW 
State v, Penney, slip op. No, 880371-CA (June 14, 1989, 
Utah Ct. of App.) is reproduced in the addendum to this brief. 
NATURE AND JURISDICTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This brief is filed in opposition to the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari seeking judicial review by the Supreme Court 
of the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals referred to above and 
included herein in the addendum. The order of the Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the Defendant's 
Motion to Terminate Probation, Nunc pro Tunc after the expiration 
of the statutory eighteen-month period. The Utah Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction to consider the State's petition pursuant to 
78-2-2(3)(a) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended and pursuant 
to Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The pertinent Constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules that this Court will be required on are: 
1. 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and 
as written prior to July 1, 1989, as well as Rules 42 and 43 of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 18, 1985, Leon Earl Denney plead guilty to 
two Third-Degree Felony offenses of uttering a forged 
prescription in the Fifth District Court of Iron County, State of 
Utah, with the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Circuit Judge, sitting 
as District Judge by appointment presiding. The Defendant was 
then sentenced by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Circuit Judge (at 
that time), and sitting by appointment on March 20, 1986. Judge 
Eves conducted the sentencing proceeding on March 19 and March 
20. The State claims in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari that 
the Defendant requested that he be placed on probation for a 
period of three years. It is true that the Defendant's counsel 
submitted to the trial court a list of recommendations entitled 
Defense Counsel!s Recommendations. However, there is no point in 
the record where the Defendant himself either acknowledged those 
recommendations by his counsel or waived his right to an 
eighteen-month period of probation as provided by 77-18-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as written at that time. On April 12, 
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1988, while the Defendant was on probation, Judge J. Philip Eves, 
having been appointed as District Judge for the Fifth Judicial 
District Court for Iron County, State of Utah, issued an order to 
show cause ordering the Defendant to appear and show cause why 
his probation should not be revoked based upon allegations that 
the Defendant had violated the probation agreement. On April 28, 
1988, the Defendant requested the Court to issue its order to 
terminate his probation, nunc pro tunc, following the expiration 
of the eighteen month period of probation provided in 77-18-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Following a hearing on 
May 17, 1988, the Defendant's motion to terminate probation, nunc 
pro tunc, was denied, and the Court found the Defendant in 
violation of his probation and imposed the original concurrent 
sentences of zero to five years. The Defendant has been 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison on that commitment order, 
as well as a later conviction, since May 17, 1988. 
On June 14, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to termination 
probation nunc pro tunc and ordered the trial court to issue such 
an order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant-Respondent takes exception to those 
portions of the State's statement of facts wherein the three-year 
period of probation is represented as being a term expressly 
requested by the Defendant through his counsel. While it is true 
that the defense counsel, Mr. Scott M. Burns, submitted this 
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recommendation, there is no referrence in the record where the 
Defendant either agreed to those recommendations himself or 
waived the statutory eighteen month period of probation. The 
remaining facts as set forth in the State's petition are 
accurate, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court should deny a Writ of Certiorari to 
review the Court of Appeals decision for the reason that the 
Court of Appeals accurately followed the Supreme Court's decision 
in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah, 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE 
STANDARD SET FORTH IN STATE VS. GREEN, 
757 P.2D 462 (UTAH 1988). 
The Supreme Court, Justice Durham writing the unanimous 
opinion of the Court, stated in State v. Green, supra: 
In accord with this principle, we reaffirm 
that judges may exercise sentencing 
discretion within those limits established by 
the legislature; the power to fix sentencing 
limits and the power to suspend sentence in 
favor of probation are not inherent in the 
judiciary but must be authorized by statute. 
Similarly, the power to revoke probation 
must be exercised within legislatively 
established limits. 
In reversing the trial court's judgment and instructing 
the trial court to grant the Defendant's Motion Nunc pro Tunc 
Terminating Probation, the Court of Appeals followed the clear 
mandate of State v. Green, supra. The legislative direction in 
limiting probation to an eighteen-month period of time was deemed 
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by the Supreme Court, and later followed by the Court of Appeals, 
as a clear exercise of legislative discretion in limiting the 
length of time during which a person may be placed on probation. 
Just as the legislature has appropriately exercised its function 
in limiting that time, it has recently amended that statute to 
expand the probationary period for felonies to thirty-six 
months. (House Bill 314, Laws of Utah 1989, Chapter 226). 
From the reaction of the Legislature in the 1989 
legislative session, it would seem that the Legislature read 
State vs. Green, supra., and determined to extend the period of 
probation. However, this is an appropriate legislative function 
and within the province of the Legislature and not within the 
province of the court. 
The Court of Appeals in its decision in this matter as 
well as the Supreme Court in State vs. Green, supra., has 
determined that the eighteen-month limitation of probation was 
mandatory by virtue of the wording of the statute and the 
legislative intent inherent in that wording. None of the 
arguments which the State of Utah has placed before the Court .in 
its Petition for Writ of Certiorari have requested this Court to 
overrule State vs. Green, supra., and it would appear that 
case is controlling in this matter. 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court sets 
forth the standards which may apply in the decision to review an 
opinion of the Court of Appeals. As the writer of this brief 
reviews those standards, it is apparent that none of those issues 
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have been raised by the State of Utah in its Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. There is no conflict between panels of the Court of 
Appeals on an issue of law nor is the decision by the Court of 
Appeals in this matter in conflict with the decision of the 
Supreme Court in State vs. Green, supra. It is not apparent in 
this case that the Court of Appeals decision has departed at all 
from the accepted or usual course of judicial proceedings, and it 
does not appear that the Court of Appeals1 decision in this 
matter has considered an important question of State law which 
has not been settled by the Supreme Court. Rather, the Court of 
Appeals seems to be directly following State vs. Green, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Court of Appeals accurately applied the 
reasoning in State v. Green, and because the Court of Appeals has 
not taken any action which would justify a review of their 
decision under the criteria of Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should deny the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 1089. 
JAJffiS L. SHUMATE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OPPOSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI to R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 23 6 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and to Charlene Barlow, 
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Assistant Attorney General, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this 14th day of August, 1989, first class postage 
fully prepaid. 
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JUN1A889 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah# 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
Leon Earl Denney# 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No, 880371-CA 
Fifth District/ Iron County 
The Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Attorneys: James L. Shumate/ Cedar City# for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow# Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson# Garff# and Greenwood. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's revocation of his 
probation. He claims that his probation term automatically 
terminated after eighteen months by operation of law pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp. 1986).1 We agree 
and reverse. 
Defendant pleaded guilty/ on September 18/ 1985/ to two 
third degree felony charges of uttering a forged prescription 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (1985). On March 20/ 
1986/ he was sentenced to two indeterminate sentences of zero 
to five years at the Utah State Prison. The trial court 
suspended the prison term and placed defendant on supervised 
probation for a term of three years. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 was amended in 1985 and 1987. See 
1985 Utah Laws ch. 229/ § 1; 1987 Utah Laws ch. 114/ § 1. The 
provision defendant relies upon in this appeal is currently 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
ADDENDUM 
I OF 6 
Defendant completed the first eighteen months of probation 
without incident* However, on March 25, 1988, he was arrested 
for violating the terms of his probation by allegedly 
committing credit card fraud and for driving under the 
influence. On April 12, 1988, the trial court ordered 
defendant to appear before the court and show cause why his 
probation should not be revoked. Defendant filed a motion to 
terminate probation nunc pro tunc. The court denied the 
motion, revoked defendant's probation and imposed the original 
two consecutive sentences of zero to five years. 
Defendant argues on appeal that section 77-18-1(10)(a) 
mandated that his probation be terminated after eighteen months 
of incident-free probation. The state argues that it is within 
the trial court's discretion to sentence defendant to two 
consecutive terms of probation and that defendant waived his 
right to termination of probation by expressly requesting a 
three-year term of probation in lieu of a prison sentence. 
Section 77-18-1(10)(a) provided that "[u]pon completion 
without violation of 18 months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated from 
sentence, unless the person is earlier terminated by the 
court." In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the term "shall" was a strong 
legislative mandate that required probation to terminate after 
eighteen months. "This strong mandate is not consistent with 
the State's position that the eighteen-month term is 'tolled' 
when any violation occurs within the period and that there is 
no time limit for initiating a revocation action." i£l. at 
464. In response to the state's concerns regarding violation 
of the public's trust, the court held that "all but technical 
violations can be punished on their own merits and the 
defendant's past record can be considered at that time." Id. 
at 465. 
Furthermore, the court held that the power to revoke 
probation must be exercised within legislatively established 
limits. 
[W]e reaffirm that judges may exercise 
sentencing discretion within those limits 
established by the legislature; the power 
to fix sentencing limits and the power to 
suspend sentence in favor of probation are 
not inherent in the judiciary but must be 
authorized by statute. 
2 
!£. at 464. 
At the time this matter arose, section 77-18-1(10)(c) 
provided the terms for extending probation. 
At any time prior to the termination of 
probation the court may, after a hearing 
with proper notice, upon its own motion or 
the motion of the prosecutor, extend 
probation for good cause shown, for one 
additional term of 18 months in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases or six months in 
class B misdemeanor cases. The reasons 
for the extension of the probation period 
shall be made a part of the court record. 
(Emphasis added.)2 Defendant served eighteen months of 
incident-free probation. It was after this term of eighteen 
months that the court held a hearing and determined that 
defendants probation should be revoked. 
After reviewing the record, it appears that the trial 
court may have intended to sentence defendant to two 
consecutive terms of probation lasting eighteen months each. 
At the hearing on the motion to terminate defendant's 
probation, held approximately two years after the probation 
order went into effect, the court stated "[t]he eighteen months 
probation was imposed on each felony to run consecutively." 
However, neither the verbal nor the written judgment made 
any mention of two consecutive terms. Rather, the order 
unequivocally stated: -IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
Defendant, Leon Earl Denney, be placed on probation for a 
period of three (3) years from and after March 20, 1986." 
2. This section now reads: 
At any time prior to the termination of 
probation, upon a minimum of five days 
notice ana a hearing or upon a waiver of 
the notice and hearing by the probationer, 
the court may extend probation for an 
additional term of 18 months in felony or 
class A misdemeanors or six months in 
class B misdemeanors if fines or 
restitution or both are owing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(c) (Supp. 1988). 
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An unambiguous order made in a criminal proceeding cannot 
be varied by remarks made in a later hearing to coincide with 
what the judge may have intended. "Where the language of a 
judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect as 
it is written . . . .- State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. App. 466, 659 
P.2d 918, 923 (1983). It is necessary that sentences be 
rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to avoid the 
possibility of confusion and injustice. Chase v. State, 479 
P.2d 337, 339 (Alaska 1971). 
Broad and uniform recognition has been 
given to the precept that a sentence 
imposed by a court acting in a criminal 
case should be definite, unequivocal and 
unambiguous, so that both the defendant 
and the officials charged with executing 
the sentence will be fairly apprised of 
the intentions of the court. 
Id. (footnote omitted). This principle was first articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Dauaherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926), where the Court held that 
M[s]entences in criminal cases should reveal with fair 
certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious 
misapprehensions by those who must execute them.M However, 
"where the meaning is ambiguous, the pleadings and other 
documents of record may be reviewed for purposes of construing 
the meaning of the judgment.- Garcia, 659 P.2d at 923. 
The order, as written and pronounced, sentenced the 
defendant to three years of probation. The judge did not state 
in his order that this term of three years was actually two 
consecutive terms of eighteen months each.3 Although, the 
judge may have intended the terms to run consecutively, we do 
not examine his intent where the written order is unequivocal. 
Because the term of probation automatically terminated 
after eighteen months, we do not reach the merits of the waiver 
and estoppel argument. 
3. We do not reach the merits of whether the judge may 
sentence a defendant to two consecutive terms of probation 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1988). 
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The judgment is reversed with directions to grant the 
motion nunc pro tunc terminating probation. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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